The Houthis Push Toward Bab el-Mandeb as the Middle East's Two Shipping Gateways Come Under Pressure at Once

In September Yemen's Houthis swept south along the Red Sea coast, taking the port city of Mocha and then reaching Perim, the island in the middle of the Bab el-Mandeb. The advance gives them a far better position from which to watch ships moving between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The strait has not been fully closed, and merchant ships are still passing. But the Houthis' military deployments, their declaration of a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, and their attacks on Saudi cities and energy facilities have forced shipowners, oil producers and the United States to reassess the risk.

The crisis arrives as the war between Iran and the United States enters its seventh month. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen sharply. Saudi Arabia had hoped to spread its risk through a Red Sea outlet; now that alternative route is under military pressure as well.

Middle Eastern energy transport thus faces an unusual situation: Hormuz, on the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula, is shaped by Iran, while Bab el-Mandeb, on the western side, is threatened by the Houthis.

The Houthis reach the southern end of the Red Sea

The Bab el-Mandeb lies between Yemen and the Horn of Africa and is about 29 km across at its narrowest. Perim sits in the middle of the strait, splitting the waterway into two channels in and out of the Red Sea.

To the north the strait connects the Red Sea and the Suez Canal; to the south it opens onto the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Ships travelling between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal must, in principle, pass through this chokepoint.

The Houthis previously controlled north-western Yemen, the capital Sanaa and the port of Hodeidah. The September offensive carried them south along the Red Sea coast; after taking Mocha they also took Dhubab, right against the strait, and reached Perim.

Holding coastline, islands and ports does not mean the Houthis can fully close the strait. Merchant ships can sail in waters further away, and the United States and its allies can deploy warships as escorts. Even so, anti-ship missiles, drones, mines and small fast boats are enough to raise the risk assessments of shipowners and insurers.

From late 2023 the Houthis repeatedly attacked merchant ships in the Red Sea, pushing Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd and several energy companies to divert around the Cape of Good Hope. This advance on land further improves their ability to watch and strike the shipping lanes.

Not closed, but shipping risk has risen

Reuters, citing ship-tracking data from Kpler, reported that only 3 commodity vessels transited Hormuz on 16 September, down from 12 the day before and against a ten-day average of about 17. Some vessels may have switched off their automatic identification systems, so the real number could be slightly higher.

Traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb has not fallen to the same degree. On the same day 21 commodity vessels passed through, and 22 on 22 September — both slightly below a ten-day average of about 26. The waterway is still working, but its traffic is highly sensitive to the fighting: on 10 September, the day the Houthis took Mocha, only 6 ships had crossed by mid-afternoon local time, against 30 the day before.

According to the US Energy Information Administration, the Bab el-Mandeb carried about 12% of seaborne oil trade in the first half of 2023, before the Red Sea crisis; in normal times roughly 12% of global trade passes through it as well. If ships avoid it, routes between Asia and Europe must go round the southern tip of Africa, adding weeks to the voyage and raising fuel, scheduling and insurance costs.

These effects do not wait for a formal closure. Once shipowners judge the military risk to be beyond what they can accept, they may reroute on their own. EIA data show LNG shipments through the Bab el-Mandeb fell to almost nothing in 2024 and the first half of 2025, while crude flows more than halved — security concerns alone were enough to change shipping choices.

Saudi Arabia's alternative export line comes under attack

Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz carried about a fifth of global oil consumption. Once Iran restricted passage, Saudi Arabia leaned harder on its East–West pipeline, which carries crude from the eastern oilfields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea.

The pipeline runs about 1,200 km with a maximum capacity of roughly 7 million barrels a day. Since Hormuz shipping was disrupted, about 4 million barrels a day has flowed through the system to the Red Sea — around 4% of global supply.

On 10–11 September, drones struck the pipeline, damaging three pump stations. Iraq confirmed the drones were launched from its Maysan province, pointing to pro-Iranian militias, which deny involvement. Saudi Arabia restored partial operation on 22 September, but returning to full capacity may still take six to eight weeks.

The export terminal has become a target too. On 24 September the Houthis claimed strikes on Saudi Aramco facilities at Yanbu and a “sensitive target” in Riyadh; Saudi forces said they intercepted six ballistic missiles, with no damage confirmed. The next day President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would send soldiers, radars and air-defence systems to protect Yanbu, while the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey arranged an urgent meeting of military chiefs under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

And even when crude does reach Yanbu, cargoes bound for Asia must still head south through the Bab el-Mandeb; those bound for Europe must go north through the Suez Canal. The Houthi advance exposes the very export route Saudi Arabia was using to avoid Hormuz to a new set of risks.

Saudi Aramco and other producers have therefore expanded ship-to-ship transfers off Oman. Shuttle tankers carry crude through Hormuz and transfer it to very large crude carriers in safer waters.

An estimated 2.5 million barrels a day moved this way in September, up from 1.4 million in August. But VLCC freight from the Gulf to China has risen to more than $30 a barrel — over a quarter of the oil price. Before the war, freight was typically just 2–3% of the cost of crude.

The Houthis are not fully controlled by Tehran

The Houthis emerged in the 1990s from a Zaydi revivalist movement in northern Yemen and seized the capital, Sanaa, in 2014. Saudi Arabia led a military coalition into the war in 2015 but could not force them out of the north-west.

Iran supplies the Houthis with weapons, money and training. The United States has also accused Lebanon's Hezbollah of helping them build missile and drone capabilities.

Yet the Houthis have their own religious, political and tribal base. Their leadership does not regard Iran's Supreme Leader as its highest religious authority, and their relationship with Tehran differs from that of Hezbollah or some Iraqi Shia militias.

The Houthis deny being an Iranian proxy and claim to develop most of their weapons themselves. Public evidence shows close cooperation between the two, but not enough to conclude that every military operation is ordered directly by Iran.

The distinction matters for diplomacy. Iran can exert influence over the Houthis, but may not be able to order them to halt on its own. The Houthis, for their part, can use their geography to extract political concessions from Saudi Arabia, the United States or the Yemeni government.

Washington avoids opening another front

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has asked President Trump for military assistance. So far Washington has agreed to share intelligence and help with targeting, but has not committed to direct involvement.

Renewed US strikes on the Houthis would end the arrangement the two sides reached in 2025, under which the US military halted air strikes and the Houthis stopped attacking American ships.

Direct intervention would also require ships, aircraft, intelligence and surveillance systems, and air-defence interceptors. With US forces already fighting Iran, taking on Red Sea air defence and strike missions in Yemen would add further strain on munitions and deployments.

US officials remain in private contact with the Houthis. Reuters, citing several sources, reported that the two sides met in Oman in mid-September. Houthi representatives said they would keep their commitment not to attack US or Israeli ships, but might continue to target Saudi vessels.

The State Department has not confirmed the meeting. If the commitment holds, the Houthi strategy looks more like selective pressure than an indiscriminate blockade of all shipping.

The straits become part of the ceasefire talks

On 22 September, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met US envoy Steve Witkoff on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. According to Iranian state media, Tehran set out its conditions for reopening Hormuz: lifting the naval blockade, releasing frozen Iranian assets, and ending all fighting by the “axis of resistance”.

That last condition means Yemen, the Red Sea and Hormuz have been folded into a single negotiating framework. Iran can apply pressure directly through Hormuz, and add to its leverage on the Red Sea side through its relationship with the Houthis.

For now the talks are deadlocked. On 26 September Trump rejected Iran's seven-day roadmap — releasing frozen funds, lifting oil sanctions and ending the naval blockade in exchange for reopening the strait and starting talks on a final deal — calling it “not acceptable”. Araghchi replied that Iran “will not back down”.

Saudi Arabia's choices are harder. Expanding air strikes on Yemen again could invite more missile and drone attacks; accepting talks could let the Houthis keep the coastal positions they have just taken.

Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with the Saudi crown prince on 22 September, calling for safe passage through Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb and backing a political settlement in Yemen. The Group of Seven, for its part, called on Iran to stop supporting the Houthis.

These diplomatic initiatives have yet to form a common framework, but all of them reflect the same fact: sea lanes have become a core issue in regional ceasefire talks.

The humanitarian crisis spreads south with the front

Major fighting between the Yemeni government and the Houthis fell sharply after the UN-brokered truce of 2022. This offensive along the Red Sea coast has reheated a civil war that had long been frozen.

The UN estimates that more than 130,000 people have been displaced since the start of September; on 22 September UNHCR said its planning projections showed another 100,000 could be forced from their homes within three months. More than 3,000 have already fled in overcrowded boats to Djibouti, Somalia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa.

UNHCR needs $194 million for its Yemen operations this year and has received only $34 million — less than a fifth. It expects more than 10,000 further arrivals in Djibouti by mid-October, when calmer seas encourage departures, which could put local health and education services under greater strain.

Maritime security also affects Yemen itself. The country depends heavily on imported food, fuel and humanitarian supplies. Fewer port calls, higher insurance premiums or attacks on ports would all raise living costs and the cost of relief.

The two straits are not yet closed at once

The more accurate description for now is that traffic through Hormuz is severely restricted, while the Bab el-Mandeb faces a rising military threat. Neither route has stopped entirely; a full closure remains a risk scenario.

Positions around Mocha and Perim have strengthened the Houthis' ability to watch and strike. Sustaining a long blockade, however, would still mean facing countermeasures from the United States, Saudi Arabia, the Yemeni government and other naval forces.

In the short term the shipping market is likely to keep supplies moving through escorts, switched-off identification systems, ship-to-ship transfers and voyages around the Cape of Good Hope. These measures can limit the disruption, at the price of higher freight, insurance and delivery times.

Whether the United States intervenes directly in Yemen will depend on whether the Houthis attack American ships, and on how badly Saudi energy facilities are damaged. The talks between Iran and the United States will decide whether Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb can be handled separately.

As long as both routes are under the influence of military force, Middle Eastern energy security can no longer rest on a single alternative route. Producers can reshuffle ships and pipelines, but they cannot fully escape the constraints of geography.