NATO Cracks Before the Ankara Summit: Europe Confronts the Security Reality of Accelerated U.S. Withdrawal
The NATO Ankara Summit on July 7–8 was supposed to be a showcase of European defense contributions. Yet, as the geopolitical rift between the U.S. and its European allies widens—accelerated by the conflict with Iran—Europe must confront a conditional security order and reconstruct its own defense, logistics, and intelligence 'operating system.'
3 Key Takeaways
- NATO 3.0 and Conditional Commitments: The U.S. is transitionally shifting its defense guarantees from unconditional to highly conditional. Europe is forced to become the main conventional shield, while the U.S. reserves only its nuclear deterrent and specific high-end assets.
- The 'Operating System' Gap: Money cannot quickly replace critical capabilities. While Europe is spending more, it lacks the battlefield ISR, aerial refueling, satellite communications, and command-and-control (C2) frameworks—the strategic 'operating system' currently provided by the U.S. military.
- Turkey's Pivotal Geopolitical Role: Host nation Turkey, boasting NATO's second-largest military and a surging defense industrial complex, highlights the contradictions of European strategic autonomy. Europe wants to reduce reliance on the U.S. but struggles to integrate highly capable peripheral allies like Turkey.
The upcoming NATO Ankara Summit on July 7–8 was originally intended to celebrate a milestone.
European allies have significantly increased defense spending over the past year, and the Hague Summit's goal of 5% GDP for defense and security investments is rapidly becoming the new political benchmark. Through defense funding vehicles like ReArm Europe and SAFE loans, the EU has attempted to convert budgetary commitments into physical ammunition, missiles, air defenses, UAVs, electronic warfare, space, and C4ISTAR systems.
Yet, even before the summit opens, the agenda has been entirely overshadowed by a pressing question: is the United States accelerating its strategic withdrawal from European security?
Ahead of the summit, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) noted that European allies hoped the Ankara Summit would serve as a defense spending report card. Instead, because of deep U.S.-Europe rifts following the war in Iran, it has devolved into a high-stakes pressure test on NATO's future structural integrity. This is not just a temporary dip in diplomatic relations; rather, the transatlantic security order is entering an entirely new phase.
Europe is Spending More, but Fails to Buy U.S. Patience
Historically, Washington's primary grievance with NATO was under-spending by European allies. This issue became exceedingly sharp under Donald Trump's presidency, and European countries have indeed responded. Following the 2025 Hague Summit, NATO pushed its long-term targets from 2% to 5% of GDP—allocating 3.5% for core defense and 1.5% for infrastructure, cybersecurity, civil resilience, and defense industrial capacity.
On paper, Europe's progress is notable. Poland is pushing toward a 5% GDP defense budget, Baltic states rank among the top spenders, and Germany is leveraging debt financing and special funds to rearm. The EU's SAFE mechanism provides up to €150 billion in loans to encourage joint procurement, lowering the traditional fragmentation, duplication, and undercapacity of the European defense industry.
However, Washington is no longer just asking for more money. It demands concrete capability, deployment speed, and political alignment. As NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte remarked in Washington, "Russia is not afraid of commitments, but of capabilities." This summarizes the core friction at Ankara: defense budgets are merely the starting line; whether Europe can translate these budgets into operational, ready forces is the real test.
Washington's growing impatience with Europe is no longer just about financial burden-sharing; it is about strategic trust.
The budget buys the bottom layer, not the five above it
- Nuclear deterrenceRetained by Washington
The guarantee is shifting from unconditional and automatic toward conditional and reciprocal — and this layer is not part of what transfers.
- Command and control (C2)
What welds national forces, intelligence, and fires into something that can fight as one. It is organisation, training, and a software stack — not a purchase order.
- Satellite support
Communications, positioning, warning, and imagery. Being able to launch is not the same as holding a constellation and ground segment that can sustain an operational tempo.
- Air-to-air refuelling
Determines how far aircraft reach and how long they stay. Fleet size and crew training take years that money cannot compress.
- Battlefield ISR
You cannot strike what you cannot see. Europe has long depended on US reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting.
- Munitions, missiles, air defence, drones, EW, space, and C4ISTAR procurementThe budget is buying this
ReArm Europe and the SAFE defence loan facility (up to €150 billion) encourage joint procurement to address fragmentation, duplication, and thin capacity. This layer has line items and contracts; the layers above it do not.
What the budget is buyingNot purchasable near-term — still supplied by US forces
The Iran War Triggered the Rift Early
The immediate catalyst for the Ankara tension is the conflict involving the U.S., Israel, and Iran. Some European allies' refusal to provide military bases, airspace, or political endorsement has led Washington to conclude that NATO allies fail to stand by the U.S. during critical moments of need.
Spain refused to allow U.S. forces to use joint bases or airspace to support operations, Italy imposed strict legal restrictions, and the UK hesitated before confirming base access. While these decisions have domestic constitutional, legal, and public opinion rationale within Europe, they were interpreted in Washington as allies enjoying American protection while refusing to reciprocate in times of crisis.
Consequently, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the Ankara Summit as one of the most important meetings in NATO's history, declaring that certain relationships must be "clarified and corrected." Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth took an even more direct tone. At the NATO defense ministers' meeting on June 18, he announced a comprehensive 6-month review of U.S. force posture and base arrangements in Europe, referring to it as the "NATO 3.0 review."
Hegseth's message was unambiguous: Europe must assume the primary role in its own defense. His statement that "NATO will be a two-way street" means the U.S. will no longer treat NATO as a unilateral American guarantee, but will demand equivalent commitments in defense spending, basing, airspace, operational support, and political backing during crises. The Iran war accelerated a power shift that could have otherwise been negotiated gradually.
Withdrawal is Not Just About Troop Count
Europe's real anxiety lies not in the subtraction of a few thousand U.S. soldiers, but in the reduction of high-end capabilities that are nearly impossible for Europe to replicate quickly.
According to Reuters, citing the New York Times, the U.S. plans to significantly scale down military assets designated for NATO's European operations. This includes reducing F-16 and F-15E fighter deployments from 150 to 100, maritime patrol aircraft from 26 to 15, withdrawing 8 aerial refueling tankers, and redeploying a missile-capable submarine, an aircraft carrier, and portions of bomber wings.
These items are not random; they represent the exact capabilities Europe lacks: long-range strike, aerial refueling, maritime ISR, strategic mobility, missile defense, and integrated command-and-control. While Europe can accelerate the manufacturing of artillery shells, missiles, and air defense batteries, it cannot easily replicate the battlefield awareness, satellite support, and C2 architecture built by the U.S. over decades.
As a Reuters column highlighted, the U.S. functions as NATO's "operating system"—the critical framework linking sensors, weapons, data, and mission planning. Without it, the effectiveness of European forces drops precipitously. This is precisely what Europe cannot replicate independently.
Europe Wants a Roadmap; the U.S. Applies Pressure
European leaders expected a manageable transition where the U.S. slowly handed over conventional defense responsibilities while Europe steadily built up capacity. This is the "NATO 3.0" envisioned by some U.S. officials, where the U.S. remains in the alliance, but Europe acts as its own conventional shield.
But instead of a jointly negotiated roadmap, Washington is delivering unilateral adjustments and political pressure. Europe needs years to build ammunition production, air defense nets, long-range fire capabilities, satellite systems, and supply chains.
The U.S. believes that without severe pressure, Europe will not move fast enough. This creates a dangerous paradox: U.S. withdrawal is meant to force European responsibility, but withdrawing too quickly exposes Europe to severe security risks before its capabilities are ready. As CFR concluded, Europe is unlikely to secure a stable NATO 3.0 transition roadmap; Washington will deploy forces based on its own terms rather than European schedules.
Turkey as the Complex Host
Hosting the summit in Ankara injects another layer of geopolitical complexity.
Turkey has NATO's second-largest military and a rapidly expanding defense industry, especially in UAVs, counter-UAS systems, air defense, missiles, naval vessels, and cyber warfare. Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler stated before the summit that NATO is not in crisis, but adapting to a changing environment, stressing that the U.S. has no intention of leaving but wants Europe and Canada to take up more responsibility.
President Erdoğan focused on alliance solidarity and industrial trade restrictions. He demanded that allies lift defense trade restrictions against Turkey and integrate it into European security initiatives. This exposes a core contradiction: if Europe wants to strengthen its defense, can it continue to exclude a military and industrial powerhouse like Turkey from its defense initiatives?
Despite rifts over human rights, the Mediterranean, and Russia, Turkey's military capacity is too massive for Europe to ignore. Ankara is a mirror reflecting the dilemma of European strategic autonomy: wanting to reduce U.S. dependency, yet failing to integrate its most capable regional allies.
Fragile European Solidarity
Facing U.S. pressure, European leaders are attempting to show a united front. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz gathered leaders from the UK, France, Italy, and Poland in Berlin to reinforce NATO's European pillar. Yet, internal divisions persist.
The Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS) remains bogged down by strategic and management disputes, showcasing the difficulty of joint weapons development. Italy and Poland have also expressed frustration with a Franco-German-UK core directing Ukraine policy. Southern European nations face domestic legal and political constraints regarding base access, while Eastern European states care primarily about maintaining U.S. boots on the ground.
To build a "European pillar," Europe must first reconcile its internal power distribution. Germany has the capital; France has the nuclear deterrent and strategic culture; Poland has frontline pressure and high defense spending; the UK is a vital military power despite Brexit; Italy and Spain are focused on the Mediterranean.
These countries have a shared threat perception but differ significantly on priorities, industrial division, and relations with the U.S. The faster the U.S. withdraws, the greater the pressure on European integration; the slower European integration moves, the harder it will be to fill the resulting security vacuum.
The four things a European pillar needs sit in four different countries
| Member | What it brings | What it worries about most | Where it snags |
|---|---|---|---|
| GermanyMoney | Debt financing and a special budget — currently the fiscal capacity most able to accelerate rearmament. | Strengthening NATO’s European pillar while keeping the transatlantic link. The two do not always point the same way. | The Franco-German FCAS programme has stalled over strategy and management. Money does not confer the ability to lead joint development. |
| FranceNuclear forces and strategic culture | The EU’s only nuclear-armed state, and the earliest advocate of strategic autonomy. | Reducing dependence on the United States is an objective in itself, not merely a response to American pressure. | Italy and Poland object to a Franco-German-British lead on Ukraine policy, seeing other significant members shut out. Leadership itself is contested. |
| PolandFront-line exposure | Moving toward 5% of GDP on defence, alongside the Baltic states at the top of the spending table. | Whether US forces stay on the eastern flank — a question that outweighs any budget line for Central and Eastern Europe. | Spends the most and carries the most risk, yet sits outside the core of common policy — outlay and voice are not aligned. |
| United KingdomMilitary weight, outside the EU | Still a major European military power, but no longer inside the EU’s joint procurement and financing instruments. | Its relationship with Washington. It hesitated over the Iran campaign before confirming US access to its bases. | The EU toolbox is built around member states, leaving one of Europe’s most experienced militaries outside the mechanism. |
| TürkiyeIndustrial capacity | NATO’s second-largest army, plus fast-growing drone, counter-drone, air defence, missile, naval, and cyber capacity — precisely where Europe’s gaps are. | Wants allies to lift defence-trade restrictions and to be written into European security initiatives. | Unresolved disputes with the EU over politics, human rights, the Mediterranean, and Russia keep it out of parts of European defence planning — the missing capabilities and the excluded ally are the same list. |
Europe does not lack resources; the resources sit in different places. The money is in Germany, the nuclear forces and strategic culture in France, the front-line urgency and high spending in Poland, the most-needed industrial capacity in Türkiye — and Britain’s military weight is outside the EU’s toolbox.
The last column is the point. Each member is stuck for a different and unrelated reason, which means no single decision unblocks them. The faster Washington draws down, the greater the pressure to integrate; the slower the integration, the harder the gap is to close.
Source: Impactful Creative, compiled from the national positions and pre-summit statements described in this articleThe Essence of NATO 3.0: Alliance Remains, Guarantees Weaken
NATO 3.0 sounds like an upgrade, but in practice, it is a redistribution of power.
Cold War NATO was U.S.-dominated; post-Cold War NATO was U.S.-led with a European peace dividend; today's NATO is moving toward the U.S. retaining its nuclear umbrella and specialized high-end capabilities, while Europe shoulders conventional defense and regional operations.
This does not mean the U.S. will exit NATO. But even if it stays, it may no longer provide the highly predictable, automatic, and abundant security guarantees of the past. European security was built on the assumption of automatic U.S. integration during crises.
Now, Europe must plan for a scenario where the U.S. is present but offers less, moves slower, and conditions its commitments on European political cooperation in other global theaters. This conditional commitment is harder to handle than an outright exit: an exit forces immediate restructuring, whereas conditional support encourages hesitation and delayed decisions.
After the Ankara Summit: Filling Capability Gaps, Not Just Spending Percentages
The most likely outcome of the summit is a veneer of unity overlaying deep internal anxiety. While joint declarations will reaffirm NATO solidarity, support for Ukraine, and defense industrial ramp-ups, the core divisions will remain.
Europe must resolve several concrete problems:
1. How to build autonomous ISR, satellite, early warning, and battlefield data integration without full U.S. support.
2. How to close air and missile defense gaps exposed by the war in Ukraine.
3. How to establish long-range fires and ammunition manufacturing capacity, moving from raw procurement to sustainable manufacturing.
4. How to foster functional defense industrial division among the EU, NATO, UK, Turkey, Norway, and others instead of duplicating and excluding each other.
5. How to establish European-led command, control, and data-sharing architectures to reduce reliance on U.S. systems.
These are far more difficult challenges than simply hitting a GDP percentage target. Budget figures are easily drafted on paper, but actual capabilities require industries, talent, procurement pathways, repair infrastructures, and command integration to rise in unison.
Conclusion: Entering the Post-U.S. Guarantee Era
The significance of the Ankara Summit is not that NATO will suddenly break apart. Rather, NATO is transitioning from an era of stable, unconditional U.S. security guarantees to one where guarantees are conditional, unpredictable, and highly reciprocal.
European security will increasingly depend on whether Europe can turn its defense budgets into real, integrated combat capability. The Ankara Summit reveals that the primary question is no longer whether NATO survives, but whether Europe is ready to stand in a security order where the U.S. is slowly letting go.
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