Lawfare in the West Pacific: How Beijing Exploits Japan-Philippines Border Talks to Advance Gray-Zone Operations East of Taiwan

The initiation of maritime boundary negotiations between Japan and the Philippines represents a standard procedure under the international law of the sea. Operating under the framework of international law, Tokyo and Manila aim to formally delineate their overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelf boundaries. The objective of such bilateral negotiations is to clarify overlapping maritime rights and mitigate the inherent governance uncertainties in contested waters.

Crucially, the opening of talks does not imply that a final boundary has been established, nor does it allow the two nations to unilaterally dispose of third-party rights. As Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara noted, any future maritime delimitation agreement between Japan and the Philippines would be legally binding only on the contracting parties, possessing no binding authority over third parties under established international law.

Nonetheless, Beijing was quick to recast this routine legal diplomatic process as a sovereignty conflict. The Chinese government asserted that the Japan-Philippines negotiations infringed upon "maritime areas east of China's Taiwan Island," denouncing the talks as illegal and invalid. Shortly thereafter, the China Coast Guard (CCG) deployed vessels to conduct so-called "law enforcement patrols" east of Taiwan. In doing so, Beijing transformed a bilateral maritime law negotiation between Tokyo and Manila into a stage for asserting jurisdictional control over the waters east of Taiwan.

To achieve its strategic goals, Beijing does not necessarily need to impose an immediate naval blockade on Taiwan or declare new territorial baselines. Instead, by maintaining a persistent CCG presence—characterized by repetitive radio broadcasting, questioning merchant vessels, patrolling, and conducting maritime surveys under the guise of "normal law enforcement"—China seeks to gradually normalize its presence. Over time, waters that are outside of China’s effective jurisdiction could be repackaged as a space managed, secured, inspected, and controlled by Beijing, potentially excluding foreign vessels.

The most insidious aspect of gray-zone tactics lies in this process of normalization. It does not rely on a single, decisive kinetic conflict to alter the status quo. Rather, through cumulative, repetitive operations, it conditions the international community and regional actors to accept a state of heightened pressure as the new normal.

The East Coast of Taiwan Pushed to the Frontline

The waters east of Taiwan face the open Western Pacific, connecting the Bashi Channel, northern Luzon, Japan's Southwestern Islands (Nansei Islands), and the outer edge of the First Island Chain. Historically, this maritime domain was viewed as a strategic rear area for Taiwan's national defense, as well as a vital corridor for regional allies to maintain sea lines of communication, conduct intelligence sharing, and manage crisis response and logistics.

Beijing’s decision to target this specific area reflects a calculated strategic maneuver.

The Taiwan Strait to the west is already highly militarized, with the international community accustomed to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossing the median line, conducting encirclement exercises, and simulating blockade scenarios. In contrast, the waters east of Taiwan have long been less politicized and rarely featured on the frontlines of global media attention.

Should China succeed in establishing a routine of coast guard patrols off the coast of Hualien, east of Lanyu (Orchid Island) and Green Island, and north of the Bashi Channel, Taiwan’s defensive depth will be severely compressed. Consequently, the outer margins of the First Island Chain will be pulled directly into the sphere of Beijing's gray-zone operations.

China's recent deployment of coast guard vessels east of Taiwan marked its second such operation in approximately a month. The Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that Chinese ships were positioned 54 nautical miles east of Hualien, prompting Taiwan to dispatch patrol vessels to monitor their movements. The critical import of this maneuver lies not in whether the Chinese ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters, but in Beijing's attempt to transform the presence of the CCG east of Taiwan into a repetitive, mundane occurrence.

Beijing Seeks the Illusion of Enforcement, Not Just Patrols

China's gray-zone operations are designed as an incremental process.

First, Beijing constructs a legalistic narrative, claiming that the Japan-Philippines talks infringe upon Chinese maritime rights. Second, it rhetorically subsumes the waters east of Taiwan under the definition of "Chinese waters." Third, it dispatches coast guard and maritime safety administration vessels to interrogate merchant ships regarding their routes, origins, and destinations. Finally, it frames these coercive activities as routine measures for traffic safety, maritime rescue, hydrographic surveys, or the maintenance of public order.

While this incrementalist approach appears low-key, its geopolitical effects are profound.

Taiwan's CGA testified to the Legislative Yuan that the CCG has harassed commercial shipping, demanding departure and destination ports while asserting jurisdictional authority. In response, Taiwan's maritime authorities have instructed domestic vessels to ignore Chinese boarding demands, immediately report the incident to the CGA, and wait for Taiwanese law enforcement to intervene and establish a physical barrier if necessary.

The core of China’s maritime lawfare is not merely a show of force or vessel presence. Rather, Beijing seeks to project a convincing illusion of administrative and regulatory enforcement.

In this strategic game, if commercial vessels begin complying with CCG inquiries, if shipping companies incorporate Beijing’s administrative demands into their maritime risk-management protocols, and if international media begin labeling the waters east of Taiwan as "disputed waters," Beijing will have succeeded in rewriting the maritime order.

Jurisdiction is not solely acquired through international treaties; in gray-zone conflicts, it is accumulated through continuous behavior. Once the international community becomes accustomed to this presence, China will codify these habits into de facto facts on the water.

Why Coast Guard Vessels Excel in Gray-Zone Tactics

While Chinese warships carry immense kinetic deterrence, their deployment immediately triggers international alarm. Conversely, coast guard, maritime safety, research, and rescue vessels serve as far more convenient instruments for gray-zone maneuvers.

The appearance of grey-hulled navy vessels immediately signals a military crisis. White-hulled coast guard patrols, however, can be packaged by Beijing as benign administrative management. Similarly, the operations of scientific research vessels can be defended as harmless hydrological surveys or efforts to ensure navigational safety.

This operational template has been refined across multiple maritime domains—including the waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, various sectors of the South China Sea, and the maritime zones around Kinmen. In each instance, China first establishes a physical presence, sustains it over a prolonged period, and subsequently elevates that presence into a sovereign claim.

Should the waters east of Taiwan be successfully pulled into this gray zone, the geopolitical fallout will extend far beyond Taiwan's shores.

This maritime corridor directly impacts the navigational safety of Japan, the Philippines, the United States, Australia, and European nations. Furthermore, the flow of raw materials, manufactured goods, and energy supplies from the Middle East and Europe to East Asia relies heavily on these West Pacific and First Island Chain shipping lanes. Consequently, the expansion of CCG operations to Taiwan's east is no longer a localized cross-strait issue; it represents a major pressure test of the broader Western Pacific maritime order.

Taiwan Must Look Beyond Sovereign Rhetoric

Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has firmly refuted Beijing’s claims, asserting that China has no standing to comment on the territory and adjacent waters of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Concurrently, Taipei has expressed support for Japan and the Philippines in their commitment to resolving maritime disputes peacefully in accordance with international law.

While this official stance is necessary, Taiwan's response must transcend mere diplomatic statements.

Taiwan must ensure the international community understands how China is weaponizing the bilateral Japan-Philippines negotiations to advance its gray-zone agenda. The challenge does not stem from the bilateral border talks themselves, but from how Beijing exploits them to construct a narrative where the waters east of Taiwan are subject to Chinese administrative oversight.

Similarly, Japan and the Philippines cannot retreat into narrow, technical legal arguments stating that their agreement does not bind third parties. Given that Beijing is using their bilateral negotiations as a pretext for coercive patrols, Tokyo and Manila must actively champion freedom of navigation, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, opposition to coercion, and the principle that no maritime delimitation should infringe upon the rights of other regional stakeholders under international law.

Furthermore, Taipei must proactively inject the security of the waters east of Taiwan into its security dialogues with Japan, the Philippines, the United States, and European partners. This is not about demanding that other nations endorse Taiwan’s specific maritime claims; rather, it is about urging them to recognize how China exploits standard international law of the sea processes to expand its unilateral jurisdictional narratives.

The Graying of the Western Pacific Has Begun

A future crisis in the Taiwan Strait may not begin with missile barrages or amphibious landings. It is far more likely to commence with a combination of coast guard patrols, maritime mapping, radio interrogations, vessel boardings, legal warfare, and coordinated diplomatic statements.

Beijing is adept at weaponizing the language of routine maritime administration into tools of political coercion, employing bureaucratic and regulatory actions to create gray-zone facts on the water, which in turn pressure international actors to modify their behavior.

Taiwan's eastern flank is no longer a safe rear area; it has been transformed into a primary frontline where China is testing the limits of the Western Pacific security order.

If the international community treats CCG patrols east of Taiwan as routine maritime activity, Beijing will succeed in expanding its administrative jurisdiction without firing a single shot. However, if Taiwan and its international partners proactively name, expose, record, and counter these gray-zone maneuvers early on, this unilateral campaign of gradual expansion will struggle to gain regional acquiescence.

While Japan and the Philippines negotiate their maritime boundaries, China is actively dragging the waters east of Taiwan into its gray-zone domain. This controversy, while appearing on the surface to be a minor maritime boundary dispute, highlights a much broader systemic threat: Beijing’s aggressive application of lawfare and gray-zone operations to reshape the maritime order of the Western Pacific.

China's objective is not merely a temporary headline or a single patrol. Its long-term goal is to condition the international community to accept the illusion that Beijing possesses the administrative and regulatory authority to "enforce law" east of Taiwan. If the stability of the Western Pacific order is to be preserved, the international community must clearly expose and counter this illusion before it solidifies into an accepted reality.