After Vučić: What Serbia's Change of Government Means for China, Russia and the EU

On the evening of 25 October 2026, Aleksandar Vučić went on television to concede. “It is clear that we have lost these elections, the Student List has won,” he said. The Student List (Studentska lista) is the ticket fielded by the student protest movement. The electoral commission’s preliminary count gave it about 52.7% and Vučić’s “United Serbia” list about 39.2%. Pollsters project roughly 140 of the 250 seats in parliament for the Student List, a majority on its own. Turnout, at about 68.8%, was the highest since the break-up of Yugoslavia.

The Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has governed since 2012. Vučić became prime minister in 2014 and president in 2017, and has dominated Serbian politics for more than a decade. What ended that run was a protest movement that began when a concrete canopy collapsed at Novi Sad railway station in November 2024. Chinese contractors had just finished renovating the station, and the students’ first demand was that the documents on the works be made public.

For Serbia’s foreign relations, the change may matter less than it first appears. The Student List’s programme is about governance at home: public contracts, the rule of law, media freedom. Abroad it would keep military neutrality, decline to sanction Russia and continue the partnership with China, and on Kosovo it is harder-line than Vučić. What is more likely to change is the transparency of Chinese projects, and how far the EU is willing to trust Belgrade. Serbia’s habit of not picking a side between the big powers will largely carry on (see What Does “Not Picking a Side” Actually Look Like?).

A Station Canopy Ends 14 Years in Power

Shortly before noon on 1 November 2024, the concrete canopy over the entrance to Novi Sad station gave way. Fourteen people died that day, and the toll later rose to sixteen. The station had only recently been renovated as part of the upgrade of the Belgrade–Budapest railway, by a consortium of China Railway International and China Communications Construction Company. The consortium said that day that the canopy was part of the old station building, built at the same time, and denied having worked on it.

1 November 2024

6 July 2026

The railway is being built under an intergovernmental agreement between Serbia and China. As the European Parliament noted in an October 2025 resolution, that put the station works outside the EU’s ordinary public-procurement rules. The students’ earliest demand was the publication of every document on the project.

The protests soon became a challenge to the whole system of power. In January 2025, after supporters of the ruling party attacked a female student in Novi Sad, Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned. At the great Belgrade rally on 15 March, the Public Assembly Archive, an independent monitor, counted 275,000 to 325,000 people; the interior ministry said at least 107,000. Yet the SNS still held a majority in parliament, and in April it installed a new government under Đuro Macut, a physician. From May 2025 the students demanded an early election, which Ana Brnabić, then speaker of parliament, dismissed as a ruse.

More than a year later, on 9 September 2026, Vučić dissolved parliament and set the vote for 25 October; the regular election was not due until late 2027. On 27 September he resigned as president to lead his party’s list himself, aiming to become prime minister. Before leaving he pardoned 49 people, 23 of them in protest-related cases. Brnabić, as speaker, became acting president.

The courts have moved slowly. Goran Vesić, the former construction minister, and others were charged with endangering public safety over the collapse. The Novi Sad High Court at one point refused to confirm the indictment; the appellate court overturned that ruling in July 2026. By polling day there had been no verdict.

The Result: A Majority Alone, on an Uneven Field

According to electoral-commission data compiled by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), with 8,135 of 8,392 polling stations counted the Student List had 52.65% and United Serbia 39.2%. Of the 18 lists on the ballot, only these two cleared the 3% threshold; the remaining seats go to minority lists, which are exempt from it. Ivica Dačić’s Socialist Party, the SNS’s partner in government since 2012, took about 2.2% and falls out of parliament.

The pollsters CeSID and Ipsos project about 140 seats for the Student List and 103 for United Serbia; 126 are needed for a majority. The Student List will not need a coalition partner. Seat totals become official only when the commission declares the final result.

The campaign was not a level contest. Observers from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reported on 26 October high turnout in a polarised environment with unequal campaign opportunities, including “grave misuse of public resources, together with intimidation and pressure on voters.” Both public and private broadcasters favoured United Serbia. Election day was assessed positively in most polling stations, but the tabulation of results had procedural and transparency problems. CRTA, a domestic monitor that sampled 500 polling stations, found voters photographing their ballots at 48% of them and pressure on voters, polling-board members or observers at 29%.

Even so, nobody disputes the outcome. In conceding, Vučić called the vote “a verification of a revolution that they carried out directly with support of various European countries.” He said his party would carry on in opposition: “Some businessmen, some people will leave us, but our structure is firm… we are used to being in the opposition.”

The Student List’s candidates were chosen by the students, mostly professionals and university professors, and it has not yet named a candidate for prime minister. At the top of the list is Ilija Srđanović, a cardiology professor at the Novi Sad medical faculty and the most likely choice; Dejan Šoškić, a former central bank governor, is also on it.

China: Open the Contracts, Keep the Partnership

Under Vučić, Serbia became one of China’s closest partners in Europe. When Xi Jinping visited Belgrade in May 2024, the two sides announced a “community with a shared future in the new era.” On a state visit to Beijing in May 2026, Vučić received the Order of Friendship and the two sides signed a series of cooperation documents. The joint statement affirmed Serbia’s adherence to the one-China principle, with Taiwan “an inalienable part of China’s territory,” and China’s opposition to any imposed solution on Kosovo’s status. It also included a security clause: the two would deepen cooperation in “guarding against ‘colour revolutions,’” and continue joint police patrols and joint special-police exercises and training. Five months later, what Vučić had called a colour revolution won at the ballot box.

Economic dependence is concentrated in a handful of companies and one creditor. In 2024 Serbia exported $1.9 billion of goods to China, 93% of it copper, a business largely controlled by Zijin Mining; it imported $5.5 billion. Citing the Public Debt Administration, Radio Free Europe reported in early 2026 that Serbia owes China’s Export-Import Bank about €2.8 billion, around 11% of its external debt. That is not the whole picture: the central bank treats the total owed to China as confidential. By the count of the Serbian outlet Radar at the end of 2025, Chinese companies have won more than €12 billion in contracts over the past 13 years.

Novi Sad turned the opacity of those contracts into a political problem. In August 2025 a former infrastructure minister, Tomislav Momirović, and others were arrested on suspicion of inflating invoices linked to the two Chinese contractors, costing the budget $115.6 million. In May 2026 Serbian media reported that the organised-crime prosecutor had sent the Interior Ministry eight requests in seven months for information needed to examine the Chinese contractors, and that none had been acted on.

The Student List’s programme calls for publishing all contracts and tenders and auditing state projects, “especially those that were non-transparent or overpriced.” The same programme pledges to develop “the comprehensive strategic partnership with China” while strengthening ties with the United States. What it wants to change is how business is done, not who it is done with.

Beijing’s response was just as pragmatic. Asked by AFP on 26 October, foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said China “consistently upholds the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and respects the independent choice of the people of every country,” and was ready to work with Serbia’s new government to keep relations on a steady course. There was no congratulation and no criticism.

Some things will not change with the government. Vreme points out that international treaties bind the Republic of Serbia, not the Vučić government, and that under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties a treaty can be challenged on grounds of fraud or corruption only with concrete proof. The debt stays too. “China ties might be downgraded a bit, but foreign direct investments and economic links are already there,” says Dimitar Bechev of Carnegie Europe.

Russia: One Ally Fewer, but the Energy Lever Remains

The Kremlin responded by praising the loser. “We greatly appreciate the contribution that Mr Vucic has made to the development of our bilateral relations,” said Dmitry Peskov on 26 October, hoping he would keep contributing from opposition. As for the new government, “it takes two to tango.” Reuters noted that Moscow had lost its second European partner in six months: Viktor Orbán’s party was defeated in Hungary’s election on 12 April.

The Student List, however, has no intention of turning against Russia. Its programme would keep military neutrality and “the traditional partnership with Russia,” and it opposes sanctions in principle. Its leading candidates have also said a new government would end arms exports to war zones, including sales to Western intermediaries who pass weapons to Ukraine. In May 2025 Russia’s foreign intelligence service accused Serbia of letting its ammunition reach Ukraine through third countries, calling it a “stab in the back”; Vučić denied it, and Serbia then suspended arms exports. If the Student List makes that suspension permanent, the country that loses is Ukraine.

Energy is the new government’s first test. Serbia’s only refinery belongs to NIS, the oil company in which Russian shareholders hold 56.15%. US sanctions on NIS took effect on 9 October 2025. Hungary’s MOL is negotiating to buy the Russian stake, but the US Treasury licences covering NIS’s operations and MOL’s talks both expire on 30 October. On gas, Gazprom has extended supply to the end of 2026 on unchanged terms; Serbia has had no long-term contract since May 2025. Both deadlines will very likely arrive before the new government takes office.

According to Reuters, the Student List sees reliance on Russian gas as an acute economic dependency rather than a geopolitical alignment. That is a difference of language from Vučić; it does nothing in the short term for Serbia’s energy security.

The EU: The Door Is Open, Kosovo Stands in It

Brussels was the warmest. António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen said in a joint statement that they stood ready to support reforms on the rule of law, media freedom and the fight against corruption. Marta Kos, the enlargement commissioner, wrote: “The door to the EU is open, and we are ready to move forward together.”

Serbia became a candidate in 2012 but has not opened a negotiating cluster since December 2021. In July 2026, when the Commission again recommended opening Cluster 3, eight member states objected: the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Croatia. A diplomat cited a “problematic” rule of law and Serbia’s refusal to align with sanctions on Russia. In September Serbia’s defence and justice ministers attended the funeral of the convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić; von der Leyen and Costa called the images “shocking.” Kos had already cancelled a trip to Belgrade the week before.

The Student List’s priorities largely match what the EU asks for: the rule of law, an independent judiciary, anti-corruption. Its candidates say a government should first complete reforms and close every negotiating cluster, and only then ask the public for a definitive vote on membership. In a CRTA survey carried out in June and published in July, 75% of Student List supporters leaned towards the EU and 10% towards Russia.

Kosovo stands in the doorway. The Student List holds that Kosovo remains an integral part of Serbia, and it rejects earlier agreements with Pristina on energy, vehicle licence plates and the use of the dinar. The EU makes normalisation with Kosovo a condition of membership, which puts the two positions in direct conflict. “There are strong nationalist voices in Studentska lista who would want to keep Russia onside because of Kosovo,” Bechev notes.

What Happens Next

Under Serbian procedure, the new parliament must convene within 30 days of the final results, and a government must be elected within 90 days after that, or fresh elections follow. A presidential vote is also close: because Vučić resigned on 27 September, an early presidential election must be held by 27 December. For now the presidency is held on an acting basis by Brnabić, of the SNS, in her capacity as speaker of parliament.

Five signals are worth watching:

• Whom the Student List nominates as prime minister, and who takes foreign affairs and the interior.
• Whether the contracts and annexes for Novi Sad station and the Belgrade–Budapest railway are published, and whether prosecutors get to question the Chinese consortium’s staff.
• Whether NIS’s US licence is extended after 30 October, and whether MOL’s purchase goes through.
• Whether the new government formally repudiates the agreements with Kosovo, and how the EU responds.
• Whom the SNS fields in December’s presidential election, and whether Vučić runs again.

What This Means for Taiwan

First, Beijing’s economic bets are on states, but its security bets are on regimes. China’s foreign ministry turned quickly to the new government, and economic cooperation will continue. Yet the clauses on “colour revolutions” and joint police patrols in the May 2026 joint statement were signed with a leadership that lost an election five months later. Serbia and Hungary were both stops on Xi Jinping’s European tour in May 2024, and both ruling parties lost elections in 2026. Beijing’s two closest partners in Europe rested on individual leaders.

Second, opaque infrastructure contracts become political liabilities. Before the canopy fell, secret contracts were a governance problem; afterwards, they were the protesters’ first demand. For anyone bidding against Chinese firms in Central and Eastern Europe, transparency and procurement standards are a competitive advantage in their own right.

Third, do not expect Serbia to move on Taiwan. The Student List intends to keep developing the comprehensive strategic partnership with China, and Serbia needs Beijing’s support on Kosovo. The one-China position will very likely pass to the new government intact.

Serbian voters were asking for a clean government that will open its books, not for a new set of allies. Serbia’s external relations will change less than its domestic governance. But every contract that is made public could change how Chinese projects in the Balkans are seen.