Defense & SecurityBy

Why Greenland Matters: Missile Warning, Arctic Sea Lanes and a Self-Governing Territory's Choices

The defence agreement signed in New York in September gives Washington more room to operate in Greenland and gives Greenland its first seat at the table as a signatory. It also settles in advance a choice a future independent Greenland might have wanted to make for itself.

The Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Pituffik Space Base, then Thule Air Base, overlooking Wolstenholme Fjord and its icebergs in northwest Greenland, August 2022
Photo: U.S. Space Force photo by Paul Honnick (public domain)

3 Key Takeaways

  • What is new is exclusion: The US already had troops in Greenland under a 1951 agreement. The new one shuts out military facilities of non-NATO states, bars investors from outside NATO, its partners and the EU from controlling sensitive sectors, and has no end date.
  • The value is in the location: The shortest path between Russia and North America crosses the Arctic, and Pituffik's radar watches it; the GIUK gap is the Russian fleet's main way into the Atlantic. Minerals and sea lanes remain on paper: Greenland's rare-earth output is still zero.
  • Status came with a commitment: Greenland signed as a party for the first time, and committed a future independent Greenland to stay in NATO and take on the agreement's obligations. The investment clause draws its line at NATO, its partners and the EU, leaving Taiwanese capital outside it.

On 22 September 2026, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, President Donald Trump, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen signed an agreement amending the 1951 defence agreement on Greenland. Earlier, in his address to the General Assembly, Trump said the United States would “immediately begin the process of developing a large military presence in the appropriate locations,” including “building two very major military bases.”

The agreement brings a dispute of nearly two years to a pause. Trump has spoken of acquiring Greenland since 2019, and in his second term he repeatedly declined to rule out the use of force. In January 2026 he announced tariffs on eight NATO allies that had sent personnel to Greenland for exercises, then, at the World Economic Forum, said he did not intend to use force, dropped the tariffs and spoke instead of a “framework of a future deal.” Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen summed it up on the day of the signing: “It’s been a bumpy ride.”

A row that began with talk of buying Greenland has, for now, ended in a defence agreement. Sovereignty stays with Denmark, the United States gets more room to operate, and Greenland signs as a party for the first time. To see why each side settled for this, start with where Greenland sits on the map, then look at what its economy still lacks.

What the agreement says

The text is in English, Danish and Greenlandic, and the parties are the governments of the United States, the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland. The preamble reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark, recognises the people of Greenland as a people with the right to self-determination under international law, and notes that the procedure for independence is set out in Article 21 of the 2009 Act on Greenland Self-Government.

Its main provisions are these:

  • The United States may “modernize and expand” its activities at Pituffik Space Base and establish defence areas at Narsarsuaq in the south and Mestersvig on the east coast, with the details to be agreed by the three parties.
  • Any party may propose a new defence area. If the Permanent Committee cannot agree within 90 days, the talks move to deputy ministers and then to ministers.
  • US military aircraft may fly over and land anywhere in Greenland, and US public vessels have undersea access to its territorial waters, without restriction unless the parties agree otherwise. Washington may also raise concerns about construction or changes of use near a defence area that threaten its security.
  • No state outside NATO may set up manned or unmanned military installations in Greenland or keep a persistent military presence there unless the parties agree.
  • States or investors from outside NATO, its partner countries and the EU may not gain control or significant influence in “particularly sensitive” sectors, including critical infrastructure and resource extraction, or access to non-public information there that could threaten national security or public order, unless the parties agree that this poses no threat.

The agreement has no end date and can be amended only by mutual consent. If Greenland exercises its right to self-determination and becomes independent, Denmark and Greenland must ensure that the new state stays in NATO, applying for membership if necessary, and assumes all of Denmark’s rights and obligations under the agreement from the day of independence.

Both parliaments still have to approve it. Under Article XII it enters into force on the date of a diplomatic note telling Washington that Denmark and Greenland have completed their parliamentary procedures. In Greenland’s parliament, a majority of lawmakers signalled support during the October debate. Copenhagen has scheduled the first reading in the Danish parliament for 12 November and the final vote for 19 November; the government lacks a majority of its own and needs support from other parties.

Seen from above the pole, Greenland sits between North America and Russia, and beside the Atlantic’s northern gate

Map centred on the North Pole showing Greenland between North America and Russia, with Pituffik Space Base, Narsarsuaq, Mestersvig, Nuuk and Murmansk marked; the GIUK gap between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the UK; and the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s coast and the Northwest Passage through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.North PoleGREENLANDRUSSIACANADAALASKA (US)ICELANDUKARCTIC OCEANATLANTICGIUK gapNorthern Sea RouteNorthwestPassageBering Strait12345
  1. Pituffik Space Base

    The only US base in Greenland. Its early-warning radar watches for ballistic missiles that could threaten the United States and Canada, and a satellite tracking station sits nearby. The agreement lets Washington modernise and expand it.

  2. Narsarsuaq

    In the south, the site of the old US base Bluie West One; since it closed in the 1950s the population has dwindled to a few dozen. One of the two new defence areas, with details still to be agreed by the three parties.

  3. Mestersvig

    On the east coast, currently used by the Danish special forces’ Sirius Dog Sled Patrol. The other new defence area.

  4. Nuuk

    The capital and home of Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command, which gets a new headquarters under Copenhagen’s second Arctic defence package.

  5. Murmansk

    Russia’s Northern Fleet is based around here. To reach the Atlantic, the fleet has to pass through the GIUK gap.

The map is centred on the North Pole, with 50°N at the rim and the Arctic Circle dashed. On this projection a straight line through the centre is the shortest route between two points. Russia and North America face each other across the Arctic Ocean, and the radar at Pituffik (1) looks out over that sky.

The red line marks the GIUK gap, the waters between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the UK, which Russia’s Northern Fleet (5) has to cross to reach the Atlantic. The two blue dashed lines are the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, which meet at the Bering Strait. Routes and the gap are drawn schematically, not as actual tracks. Select a number on the map or an item in the list to highlight it.

Source: Borders and coastlines: Natural Earth 1:110m (public domain), drawn by Impactful Creative on a north polar azimuthal equidistant projection. Places: U.S. Space Force, CNA (Reuters), High North News. The GIUK gap and route alignments follow the Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s Intelligence Outlook 2025 and the Congressional Research Service and are schematic.

Most of what Washington won, it already had

Measured in basing rights, the agreement adds little. The US military has been in Greenland since the Second World War, and the 1951 agreement, amended in 2004, already allowed it to expand its presence with the consent of Denmark and Greenland. At the height of the Cold War the United States had 17 military installations and more than 10,000 troops on the island; today it has one base, Pituffik. As an AP analysis put it, the gains in the agreement could, ostensibly, “have been achieved by asking nicely a year ago.”

What is genuinely new is exclusion. Article IX keeps the military installations of non-NATO states out of Greenland. Article X designates critical infrastructure and resource extraction as “particularly sensitive” and restricts investors from outside NATO, its partners and the EU, writing investment screening into a defence agreement. It screens for exactly the three rights such regimes care about: control, influence and access to information (see If Both Sides Want the Deal, Why Does It Still Need a Security Review?). Secretary of State Marco Rubio said after the signing that Greenland would “forever be part of the strategic defense area of North America” and that any adversary would be excluded. The White House stressed that the deal comes “at no cost to American taxpayers.”

The flip side of costing nothing is that Greenland receives no fixed return. The agreement only asks the United States to award contracts for building and maintaining defence areas to Greenlandic businesses “to the maximum extent possible.” Pele Broberg, who leads the opposition Naleraq party, told parliament: “The US is granted extensive rights in our country. The people of Greenland are not guaranteed any fixed payment for those rights.”

The agreement also leaves room for Trump’s planned Golden Dome missile defence system. The preamble records the parties’ shared interest in giving the United States the military access it needs to defend the NATO area, Greenland and the American continent, “including through establishment of a Golden Dome defense system.” Frederiksen said no decision had been made on the specifics of that system.

Pituffik: North America’s forward warning post

Pituffik shows most clearly why Washington cares about Greenland. The base lies on the island’s northwest coast at 76°32′N, some 1,200 km north of the Arctic Circle and about 1,500 km from the North Pole. It is the US Department of Defense’s northernmost installation and the world’s northernmost deep-water port. Ice locks it in for nine months of the year, though the airfield operates year-round. Formerly Thule Air Base, it was renamed in April 2023 after a former Inuit hunting settlement nearby.

Its centrepiece is the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (AN/FPS-132), run by the 12th Space Warning Squadron. The solid-state phased-array radar has two faces of 120 degrees each, 240 degrees in all, and works around the clock to detect intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles that could threaten the United States and Canada. It also tracks objects in Earth orbit for US Space Command. A satellite tracking station nearby handles telemetry, tracking and commanding for US and allied satellites.

A flat map suggests that Russia and the United States face each other across the Atlantic; seen from above the pole, they face each other across the Arctic Ocean. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service’s 2025 annual assessment notes that the shortest path between North America and Russia runs over the North Pole, and that most of the ballistic missiles of the United States, Russia and China would travel over the Arctic in a major conflict. For the United States, it says, the Arctic is “the first and most crucial line of early warning,” and the radars at Pituffik are central to detecting missiles heading for the US mainland.

The GIUK gap: the Atlantic’s northern gate

Greenland’s second asset is at sea. The waters between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the United Kingdom were known throughout the Cold War as the GIUK gap. The Danish intelligence service describes them as Russia’s main maritime gateway to and from the Arctic. In a war with NATO, it says, Russia would try to slip attack submarines through the gap undetected to cut supply lines between the United States and Europe, while tracking NATO submarines in the same waters.

Most of Russia’s nuclear-armed submarines are stationed in the Arctic, and its Northern Fleet is based around Murmansk; Russia’s newest nuclear-powered submarine joined the fleet in July 2025. The Danish service also reports that Russia systematically monitors NATO activity and charts the gap with military and civilian vessels, fishing boats among them, as well as aircraft and satellites, to refine its plans for a possible conflict.

After the Cold War, NATO turned its attention to the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the US placed its underwater sound surveillance system on standby. A 2017 tabletop exercise run by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) found participants unfamiliar with the gap geographically, strategically and tactically; one of its conclusions was that no plan can adequately defend the Atlantic without access to Iceland. The same logic applies to Greenland at the gap’s western end.

Much of Denmark’s new spending goes to these waters. In January 2025 the Danish defence ministry announced a first Arctic and North Atlantic package worth DKK 14.6 billion, including three new Arctic naval vessels, two long-range drones, and satellite and ground-based sensors. In October it added DKK 27.4 billion for maritime patrol aircraft, acquired with a NATO ally, two more ice-capable ships and a new telecommunications cable between Greenland and Denmark. Article VIII of the agreement records Denmark’s pledge to keep strengthening its Arctic posture on land, at sea, in the air and in space. On why repair capacity matters once a cable is damaged, see After the Cable Breaks: How Repair Capacity Shapes a State’s Strategic Choices.

NATO launched Arctic Sentry in February 2026, though AP reported that it began mainly as a NATO label for national exercises such as Denmark’s and Norway’s, without any permanent or long-term deployment of troops under a NATO banner. Article II of the new agreement backs a stronger NATO role in Arctic planning, presence, exercises and joint intelligence gathering; how far that goes depends on what the allies are willing to commit.

Arctic sea lanes: shorter, not yet cheaper

The third asset usually cited is shipping. As the sea ice retreats, two trans-Arctic routes could open up: the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s coast and the Northwest Passage through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, together the Arctic shipping routes. The Congressional Research Service describes the Northern Sea Route as about 2,600 nautical miles long, running from Murmansk to near the Bering Strait, opened to foreign ships in 1991 and suited to trade between northern Europe and northeast Asia north of Singapore. The Northwest Passage is less commercially viable, and cargo transits have been extremely rare.

The distances are shorter. A Korean government think tank, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, estimates that the Arctic route cuts about 7,000 km and roughly ten days off the traditional Asia–Europe route through the Suez Canal, according to AFP. By the end of September 2026, the Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL) at Norway’s Nord University had recorded container ships sailing from Busan, Qingdao and Ningbo to Britain in 20 to 21 days.

Distance is only one cost. The route is open for a few months a year: the 2025 transit season ran from 30 June to 17 November, about four and a half months, and with poor ice conditions the open-water window lasted no more than two weeks. Of 103 transit voyages that year, tankers carried the largest share of the cargo, mostly crude oil from Murmansk and Russia’s Baltic ports heading east. Just one voyage ran directly between Asian and European ports with Russia as neither origin nor destination.

Traffic picked up in 2026, the year war in the Middle East disrupted global shipping. By the end of September there had been 104 transits, more than in all of 2025, carrying an estimated 3.7 million tonnes of cargo; yet only four were international Asia–Europe voyages. Compared with the scale of the Suez Canal and Red Sea route (see Why Does Trouble in the Red Sea Send Ships Between Asia and Europe the Long Way Round?), the Northern Sea Route remains a seasonal supplement.

It is also Russia’s route. The Congressional Research Service warns that unpredictable ice makes the reliable schedules container shipping depends on hard to keep, and that several container lines and shippers have pledged not to ship through the Arctic. Ships need ice-class hulls and icebreaker escorts, and that equipment sits idle outside the season, so “shorter via the Arctic does not necessarily mean cheaper and faster.” AFP has reported that foreign ships pay Russia for navigation and weather services along the way, which some experts fear could cross Western sanctions lines, and the Danish intelligence service notes that Russia already imposes navigation restrictions in some northern waters beyond what international maritime law permits.

What China wants from the Arctic

China’s interest is on paper. Its January 2018 white paper, China’s Arctic Policy, calls China a “Near-Arctic State,” proposes building a “Polar Silk Road” with other parties and encourages Chinese companies to take part in building Arctic route infrastructure and in commercial trial voyages. In the Danish intelligence service’s assessment, Beijing wants unrestricted access to Arctic sea lanes to reduce its reliance on chokepoints such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca, whose closure in a crisis could hit the Chinese economy hard.

China has no military presence in the Arctic today, but the service judges that Beijing aims to be able to operate surface ships and submarines there independently within five to ten years. Its long-term goal is to hide missile submarines under the ice and gain the same nuclear second-strike capability as Russia and the United States. Its icebreaker fleet is growing too: in 2024 it had three icebreakers in the Arctic at once for the first time, and in 2025 four icebreakers and a research vessel. In the summer of 2024, Chinese and Russian strategic bombers flew their first joint patrol north of the Bering Strait.

In Greenland itself, China has made little headway. The Danish service says Chinese companies’ interest in investing there has so far produced no tangible results, and that tightening scrutiny in the Western Arctic states is making Russia China’s main gateway to the region. Reuters has reported that US officials lobbied the former owner of the Tanbreez rare-earth deposit in southern Greenland not to sell to a Chinese developer. Articles IX and X of the new agreement turn these piecemeal precautions into standing rules.

Rare earths: reserves are not supply

In mid-October, after a campaign stop in Alaska, Trump posted that “Massive Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration is getting ready to begin in our new and beautiful Greenland!” and called the island “second to none” for the security of the United States and Europe. Reality moves more slowly. As AP noted, no rare-earth or oil and gas venture in Greenland has ever got past exploration, and in 2021 the island said it would issue no new oil and gas permits. Naaja Nathanielsen, one of Greenland’s two members of the Danish parliament, put it plainly: there would be no Greenlandic oil in the near future.

Rare earths, a textbook case of critical minerals, tell the same story. The US Geological Survey’s February 2026 Mineral Commodity Summaries put Greenland’s rare-earth reserves at about 1.5 million tonnes of rare-earth-oxide equivalent, close to America’s 1.9 million, yet its output in 2024 and 2025 was zero. China, by the same count, holds 44 million tonnes and mined an estimated 270,000 tonnes in 2025, about 70% of world output of 390,000 tonnes; since April 2025 it has also placed export controls on the metals, alloys, compounds and oxides of seven rare-earth elements.

Greenland’s rare-earth reserves are close to America’s; its output is zero

Unit: tonnes, rare-earth-oxide equivalent

Rare-earth mine production, 2025 (estimated)

  • China270,000

    Roughly 70% of world output of 390,000 tonnes.

  • United States51,000
  • Australia29,000
  • Burma22,000

    Estimated from China’s import data.

  • Russia2,600
  • Brazil2,000
  • Greenland0

    No rare-earth mine has yet gone into production.

Unit: million tonnes, rare-earth-oxide equivalent

Rare-earth reserves

  • China44
  • Brazil11
  • Australia6.3
  • Russia3.8
  • United States1.9
  • Greenland1.5

    The same order of magnitude as the United States, with no output.

The top panel shows rare-earth mine production in 2025 (estimated); the bottom panel shows reserves. The units differ: production is in tonnes and reserves in millions of tonnes, both in rare-earth-oxide equivalent. Greenland’s reserves of about 1.5 million tonnes are close to America’s 1.9 million, yet its output is zero.

China, the largest producer, also holds the largest reserves. Brazil ranks second on reserves but is estimated to have mined only about 2,000 tonnes in 2025, another sign of how long it takes reserves to become supply. Only some countries are shown; Burma has no reserves figure, so it appears in the top panel only.

Source: U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, Rare Earths (February 2026); Burma’s output is the USGS estimate from Chinese import data

Greenland’s two best-known deposits are stuck for different reasons. Kvanefjeld (Kuannersuit in Greenlandic), in the south, stalled after 2021: that November Greenland’s parliament banned uranium mining, along with mining other minerals whose average uranium content exceeds 100 ppm. According to the developer, Energy Transition Minerals, the government then cited the new law in no longer recognising its right to apply for an exploitation licence and formally refused one in 2023; in June 2026 it also declined to extend the project’s exploration licence. The company’s arbitration and court cases continue, and it says it has been told the licence area will not be reassigned while they are unresolved. Tanbreez, also in the south, is being developed by the US-listed Critical Metals. In June 2025 the Export-Import Bank of the United States issued a letter of interest for a loan of up to $120 million, but that only meant the project had met the initial requirements to apply; the bank wants it well capitalised by strategic investors first.

Even once ore is mined, the real bottleneck in rare earths is separation and refining (see If Rare Earths Are Not Rare, Why Is There Still a Bottleneck?). Nor would Greenland keep all of any mining revenue: under the Self-Government Act, half of the revenue above a threshold is deducted from Denmark’s annual subsidy to Greenland. The threshold was set at DKK 75 million in 2009 and is adjusted each year for prices and wages.

A self-governing territory’s choices

Greenland has about 56,000 people, most of them Inuit, and was a Danish colony until 1953. The 2009 Act on Greenland Self-Government recognises Greenlanders as a people with the right to self-determination under international law and leaves the decision on independence to them: an independence agreement negotiated with the Danish government must be approved by Greenland’s parliament, endorsed in a referendum in Greenland and consented to by the Danish parliament. Until then, foreign and security policy remain matters for the Realm, and international agreements affecting defence and security policy are outside what Greenland can conclude on its own.

That gives the agreement the weight of a precedent. Naaja Nathanielsen called it the first binding agreement Greenland has signed as a country, “a huge step forward in our quest for more self-autonomy and a bigger seat at the table.” Vivian Motzfeldt, a former Greenlandic foreign minister, told parliament that Greenland had secured “massive” protection without having to pay for it, while winning recognition as an autonomous nation.

But the agreement also makes a choice on behalf of a future Greenland. Under Article XI, an independent Greenland must stay in NATO and take on all of Denmark’s rights and obligations under the agreement, which has no end date. In gaining the standing of a signatory, Greenland has given up in advance the option of choosing different security partners, or neutrality, after independence.

It is a choice with public backing. At the height of the crisis in January 2026, Nielsen said: “If we have to choose between the United States and Denmark here and now, we choose Denmark. We choose NATO.” A January 2025 poll by Verian for the Danish newspaper Berlingske and Greenland’s Sermitsiaq found that 85% of Greenlanders did not want to leave the Danish Realm to become part of the United States. Some 56% said they would vote for independence in a referendum held then, but 45% did not want independence if it lowered their standard of living. Denmark’s annual block grant of around $630 million weighs heavily in that calculation.

The pace of independence is still contested. In the March 2025 election, four of the five main parties favoured independence but disagreed on when and how. Demokraatit, which favours a gradual path, rose from 9% to nearly 30% of the vote, while Naleraq, the most aggressively pro-independence party, came second with almost 25%. AP has argued that Trump’s pressure took some of the edge off calls for quick independence; Naleraq’s challenge to the agreement’s economic value in parliament shows the argument is not over.

What this means for Taiwan

Taiwan’s position is different from Greenland’s, but the agreement holds three lessons worth noting.

First, a small actor’s leverage comes from location and from allies. Greenland turned pressure to sell into a written agreement because of a location no one can replace, the institutional channel its Self-Government Act provides, and the success of Danish and Greenlandic diplomats in framing the dispute as a European security problem. Yet the standing it gained also fixes its future options. When Taiwan negotiates security cooperation with partners, it too needs to know which clauses have no end date and which can be adjusted as circumstances change.

Second, the Arctic is no fallback route for Taiwan. Traffic on the Northern Sea Route has picked up since the Hormuz and Red Sea disruptions, and Taiwan falls within the “north of Singapore” range the Congressional Research Service describes. But the route opens for only a few months a year, passage depends on Russian permission and icebreakers, and it carries sanctions risk. Taiwan’s container exports to Europe normally go through the Red Sea, and its energy from the Gulf arrives via Hormuz and Malacca (see When Hormuz Tightens, Why Does East Asia Feel It First?). Both crises taught that every alternative route has its own gatekeeper; on the Northern Sea Route, the gatekeeper is Russia. For Taiwanese companies, diversification means suppliers, stocks and insurance, not a seasonal sea lane.

Third, diversifying rare earths is slower than it looks, and more a matter of blocs. Turning Greenland’s reserves into supply means clearing mining permits, the uranium ban, financing, and separation and refining, each measured in years. The new agreement’s investment clause draws its line at NATO members, NATO partners and EU member states. The agreement does not define “NATO partner,” but NATO’s published list of 35 partner countries includes Mongolia, Pakistan and the Central Asian states, and not Taiwan. Read literally, a Taiwanese investor seeking control of, or significant influence over, a Greenlandic mine or piece of critical infrastructure would need the three parties to agree first that it poses no threat. Taiwanese firms hoping to diversify supply through allied resource projects need to build clauses like this into their timelines and costs.

Leverage from geography counts only once it is written into terms. Written into terms with no end date, it also makes part of the next generation’s decision for it.

Sources

  1. The White House (agreement text), AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK TOGETHER WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND, 22 Sep 2026
  2. Associated Press (via Anchorage Daily News), Trump signs US-Denmark-Greenland agreement to bolster Arctic security, 22 Sep 2026
  3. Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport), Greenland, Denmark, and U.S. Relations, 22 Jan 2026
  4. The White House, President Trump Inks Historic Arctic Security Agreement, 22 Sep 2026
  5. Reuters (via Internazionale), Greenland lawmakers signal support for Trump security deal, 12 Oct 2026
  6. The Copenhagen Post, Danish parliament to debate Greenland-US defense agreement in November, 23 Oct 2026
  7. Central News Agency (Taiwan), citing Reuters, 美擬重啟格陵蘭舊基地 傳三方將在聯大簽約, 22 Sep 2026
  8. Associated Press (via Anchorage Daily News), Trump’s push to acquire Greenland almost broke NATO. But Greenland may be the ultimate winner., 24 Sep 2026
  9. U.S. Space Force, 821st Space Base Group, Apr 2024
  10. U.S. Space Force, Buckley Space Force Base, 12TH SPACE WARNING SQUADRON, 2023
  11. U.S. Space Force, Peterson-Schriever Garrison, Pituffik SB, Greenland, 2026
  12. Danish Defence Intelligence Service, Intelligence Outlook 2025, Dec 2025
  13. Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Forgotten Waters: Minding the GIUK Gap, 2 May 2017
  14. Danish Ministry of Defence, New agreement strengthens the presence of the Danish Defence in the Arctic and North Atlantic region, 27 Jan 2025
  15. High North News, Denmark to Strengthen Arctic Defense by DKK 27,4 Billion, 15 Oct 2025
  16. Associated Press (via PBS News), NATO launches Arctic Sentry military effort in seeking to move on from Greenland dispute, 11 Feb 2026
  17. Congressional Research Service (copy hosted by Penn State), Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 2 Jul 2025
  18. Central News Agency (Taiwan), citing AFP, 韓緊跟中國腳步試航新海路 搶進北極航運卡位戰, 22 Aug 2026
  19. Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL), Nord University, Main Results of NSR Transit Navigation in 2025, 9 Dec 2025
  20. Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL), Nord University, Overview of NSR Transit Voyages as of September 30, 2026, 9 Oct 2026
  21. State Council Information Office of China, Full text: China’s Arctic Policy, 26 Jan 2018
  22. MINING.COM, citing Reuters, Critical Metals in line for $120M US loan to fund Greenland rare earth project, 15 Jun 2025
  23. Associated Press (via Anchorage Daily News), Trump says oil, gas and mineral exploration in Greenland is set to begin. It’s not that simple, 14 Oct 2026
  24. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Rare Earths, Feb 2026
  25. High North News, Greenland Introduces Ban on Uranium, 10 Nov 2021
  26. Energy Transition Minerals (ASX announcement), Kvanefjeld Rare Earths Project, Greenland – Legal Proceedings Update, 1 Oct 2025
  27. Energy Transition Minerals (ASX announcement, via Webull), Greenlandic Government Decision on Kvanefjeld Exploration Licence extension, 29 Jun 2026
  28. Prime Minister’s Office of Denmark (translation), Act on Greenland Self-Government, 12 Jun 2009
  29. Verian, Opinion poll in Greenland, January 2025, 29 Jan 2025
  30. Associated Press (via Anchorage Daily News), Greenland’s center-right election winners push back against Trump over control of the island, 12 Mar 2025
  31. NATO, NATO’s partnerships, 12 May 2025

Related Articles

After the DMZ Mine Blast: Seoul's 'Corresponding Measures' and the Risk of Escalation in Korea
Defense & Security2026/10/26

After the DMZ Mine Blast: Seoul's 'Corresponding Measures' and the Risk of Escalation in Korea

In September 2026 a North Korean mine maimed a South Korean battalion commander inside the DMZ, and the UN Command ruled it a breach of the Armistice, though more cautiously than in 2015. That year a similar crisis climbed to an exchange of fire before loudspeakers were traded for a statement of regret. This time Seoul has dismantled its speakers, Pyongyang refuses to negotiate the border, and how far the crisis climbs depends on the means each side chooses.

Read more
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan Align: The Middle East Builds a Second Security Layer Beyond the United States
Defense & Security2026/08/08

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan Align: The Middle East Builds a Second Security Layer Beyond the United States

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement treats an armed attack on any one of the three as an attack on all — language that drew immediate comparison to NATO's Article 5. But reading it as another NATO misses the larger shift: regional powers are no longer only choosing among architectures designed elsewhere. Seventy years after the Baghdad Pact traced nearly the same geographic axis, the architects have changed.

Read more
Papua New Guinea in the New South Pacific Order: Security Alliance via the Pukpuk Treaty, Multi-Market Hedging, and Compartmentalized Diplomacy
Defense & Security2026/08/02

Papua New Guinea in the New South Pacific Order: Security Alliance via the Pukpuk Treaty, Multi-Market Hedging, and Compartmentalized Diplomacy

Papua New Guinea is deepening its military alignment with Australia under the Pukpuk Treaty and granting the US defense access, while expanding trade with Beijing and praising major Chinese investments. This 'compartmentalized alignment' is meant as a hedge, but as the lines between security, energy, and port infrastructure blur, the cost of policy ambiguity is rising fast.

Read more